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Virtually every recent report or study describes women’s progress in
achieving greater representation on corporate boards of directors as “stalled”
or some similar adjective.2 The low number of women in the corporate
boardrooms of U.S. public companies has “stayed more or less the same,
with small variations from year to year.”3 In light of the increased presence
1
Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of Cincinnati
College of Law. This essay was prepared in connection with the University of Dayton School of Law’s
Symposium on Perspectives on Gender and Business Ethics: Women in Corporate Governance, which
was held on February 25, 2011. Marli Schippers, Corporate Law Fellow and UC Law Class of 2012,
provided research assistance.
2
See, e.g., Korn/Ferry Institute, 34th Annual Board of Directors Study, 4 (Dec. 18, 2008),
http://www.kornferryinstitute.com/files/pdf1/Board_Study07_LoRez_FINAL.pdf (“stalled”); Charged
for Boardroom Change, INTERORGANIZATION NETWORK, http://www.ionwomen.org/about-us/about-us
(last visited July 20, 2011) (“stagnant”); Press Release, Latest Catalyst Census Shows Women Still Not
Scaling the Corporate Ladder in 2010; New Study Indicates Clue to Reversing Trend (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://www.catalyst.org/press-release/181/latest-catalyst-census-shows-women-still-not-scaling-thecorporate-ladder-in-2010-new-study-indicates-clue-to-reversing-trend (“stagnation”); Press Release,
2020 Women on Boards Forms Grassroots Campaign to Increase Women on Corporate Boards (Nov. 26,
2010), http://www.2020wob.com/news-and-resources/press-releases (“static”) [hereinafter 2020 Women
on Boards]. But see Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How
Much Difference Does Difference Make? 2 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper Series No.
89, 2010) (stating that women’s share of new board appointments spiked in 2009 when 39% of 424 new
director appointments were women).
3
Guys Who Get It: Business Leaders Who Understand the Value of Diversity at the Top, The 6th
Annual Status Report of Women Directors and Executive Officers of Public Companies in Fourteen
Regions of the United States, INTERORGANIZATION NETWORK, 3 (Mar. 2010),
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of women in the workplace and the failure of initiatives to date, it is time to
consider what additional efforts could be taken to improve the status quo.4
I.

THE PRESENT

A. The Numbers
Women comprise slightly more than one-half of the U.S. population
and control 76% of U.S. consumer purchasing power.5 Women account for
46.7% of the U.S. labor force and 51.5% of management, professional, and
related occupations.6 Yet women held only 14.4% of executive officer
positions and 15.7% of board seats on Fortune 500 companies in 2010.7
Moreover, the number of female CEOs was similarly small. Women
accounted for only 2.8% of CEOs at Fortune 500 companies.8 There were
fourteen female CEOs at Fortune 500 companies and nineteen female CEOs
at Fortune 501–1000 companies.9 In 2010, women executive officers held
7.6% of top earner positions at Fortune 500 companies.10
Sixty Fortune 500 companies had zero women directors in 2010.11
Only 57% of S&P 500 companies had at least two female directors, and
only 19% had more than two.12 Only seventy-two Fortune 500 companies
had 25% or more women directors.13 Progress at smaller, less visible public
companies has been even slower. Only 60% of companies comprising the
Russell 3000, and only half of the Russell 2000 companies, had at least one
female director.14
http://www.ionwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/ION_Report_web_032210.pdf; see also Missing
Pieces: Women and Minorities on Fortune 500 Boards, ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, 4 (2010),
http://theabd.org/Missing_Pieces_Women_and_Minorities_on_Fortune_500_Boards.pdf (stating that
from 2004 to 2010 the increase in women’s board seats was “not appreciable”).
4
This essay addresses only gender diversity, in keeping with the Symposium’s theme. It must be
acknowledged, however, that the lack of racial and ethnic diversity on corporate boards is also a serious
problem.
5
Virtcom Consulting, Board Diversification Strategy: Realizing Competitive Advantage and
Shareowner Value, CALPERS, 8 (2008), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/investcorp/diversification-strategy.pdf.
6
U.S. Women in Business, CATALYST (Aug. 2011), http://www.catalyst.org/publication/132/uswomen-in-business.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Women CEOs of the Fortune 1000, CATALYST (Sept. 2011), http://www.catalyst.org/publication/
322/women-ceos-of-the-fortune-1000.
10
Rachel Soares et al., 2010 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500 Women Executive Officers and Top
Earners, CATALYST, 1 (2010), http://www.catalyst.org/file/412/2010_us_census_women_executive_
officers_and_top_earners_final.pdf.
11
See Rachel Soares et al., 2010 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500 Women Board Directors,
CATALYST, 1 (2010), http://www.catalyst.org/file/413/2010_us_census_women_board_directors_
final.pdf.
12
Annalisa Barrett, Uneven Progress: Female Directors in the Russell 3000, THE CORPORATE
LIBRARY, 1 (2010), http://info.thecorporatelibrary.com/Portals/30022/docs/unpri_p1_femaledirectors.pdf.
13
2010 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500, CATALYST, app. 2 at 3 (2010), http://catalyst.org/etc/
Census_app/10US/2010_US_Census_Appendix_2_Final.pdf.
14
Barrett, supra note 12, at 1.
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Moreover, women directors do not generally hold leadership
positions on boards. There were only fourteen S&P 500 companies with
female board chairs.15 “Only forty-five S&P 500 companies ha[d] women
chairing their compensation committees, 58 ha[d] female audit committee
chairs, and 75 ha[d] women leading their nominating committees.”16 Very
few of the S&P 500 companies had women serving in two or more positions
of responsibility.17
Contrast these statistics with the fact that in 2010 women
constituted a majority of the Commissioners at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), including the Chair.18 Can anyone argue seriously
that there are not additional well-qualified women to participate in corporate
America?
B. Private Initiatives
The slow progress toward making the boardroom more
representative of the workforce is not for lack of attention to the issue from
the private sector. A number of well-respected organizations expend
considerable resources on efforts to improve diversity, including the
Alliance for Board Diversity (“ABD”),19 Catalyst,20 the InterOrganization
Network (“ION”),21 and the DirectWomen Initiative.22 A new initiative,
2020 Women on Boards, announced that it aimed to raise the percentage of

15

Id.
Id.
Id.
18
Chair Mary L. Schapiro (since 2009), Elisse B. Walter (since 2008), and Kathleen L. Casey
(2006–2011). SEC Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last visited Sept. 5,
2011).
19
The Alliance for Board Diversity (“ABD”) is a collaboration of four leadership organizations that
have a common goal to increase equitable representation of women and minorities on corporate boards.
About the Alliance Board for Diversity, ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, http://theabd.org/index.html
(last visited Sept. 15, 2011). The four organizations are Catalyst, The Executive Leadership Council, the
Hispanic Association on Corporate Responsibility, and Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc. Id.
20
Catalyst is a leading nonprofit membership organization that studies women and men across
levels, functions, and geographies to learn about women’s experiences in business, barriers to their career
advancement, and individual and organizational strategies leading to success. About Us, CATALYST,
http://www.catalyst.org/page/59/about-us (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
21
Formed in 2004, ION consists of fifteen regional organizations in the United States. Charged for
Boardroom Change, INTERORGANIZATION NETWORK, http://www.ionwomen.org/about-us (last visited
Sept. 15, 2011). It represents more than 10,000 women in business across a wide range of industries that
advocate for the advancement of women to positions of power in the business world, especially to boards
of directive and executive suites. Id.
22
“The centerpiece of the DirectWomen initiative is the DirectWomen Board Institute, an annual
two-day program providing a free orientation and update on key issues facing current and future
directors. The goal is to position an elite group of exceptional senior women lawyers for service as
directors of major U.S. corporations.” DirectWomen Board Institute Overview, DIRECTWOMEN,
http://directwomen.org/institute/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
16
17
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women on corporate boards in the U.S. to 20% or greater by 2020.23
Executive search firms and consulting firms have issued reports on the
issue.24
Institutional investors advocate for greater gender diversity. For
example, California Teachers’ Retirement System (“CalSTRS”) announced
that increasing board diversity was one of its goals in the 2011 proxy season
and that it planned to submit proposals asking companies with little or no
board diversity to ensure that women and minority candidates were included
in their pools of nominees.25 The California Public Employees’ Retirement
System (“CalPERS”) recognizes the importance of diversity on boards,
particularly to address historically under-represented groups, including
women and minorities.26 Further, CalSTRS and CalPERS are working with
a panel of leading corporate governance experts to create a digital database
aimed at increasing board diversity.27 The Diverse Director DataSource
(“3D”) aspires to provide a place for companies to recruit qualified, diverse
individuals.28 Finally, Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), the
influential proxy advisory firm, is generally supportive of proposals that
request reports on the company’s efforts to diversify the board.29
In addition to attention by institutional investors, many respected
legal scholars have studied the issue, including my fellow presenters on this
program, Douglas M. Branson,30 Joan MacLeod Heminway,31 and Darren
Rosenbaum.32 Other law schools have previously held symposia that have

23

2020 Women on Boards, supra note 2.
See, e.g., Korn/Ferry Institute, supra note 2, at 4, 6 (analyzing the stalled progress of women and
minorities on corporate boards); Virtcom Consulting, supra note 5, at 1 (“In terms of gender
representation, corporate boards are still quite clearly behind.”).
25
Rosemary Lally ed., Quarterly Governance Update, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
(Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%20center/council%20governance%20alert/
2010%20Archive/2010%20Alert%2046.pdf; see also Press Release, Cal. State Teachers’ Retirement
Sys., CalSTRS Continues to Advance Diversity on Corporate Boards (July 12, 2011),
http://www.calstrs.com/newsroom/2011/news071211.aspx.
26
Global Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance §§ 2.2, 2.4 (2010), available at
http://www.calpers-governance.org/docs-sof/principles/2010-5-2-global-principles-of-accountable-corpgov.pdf.
27
Press Release, Cal. State Teachers’ Retirement Sys., CalSTRS, CalPERS, Announce Diverse
Director DataSource (3D) – A Resource to Identify Corporate Director Candidates (Apr. 5, 2011),
http://www.calstrs.com/newsroom/2011/news040511.aspx.
28
Id.
29
2011 U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., 62 (Jan.
27, 2011), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/ISS2011USPolicySummaryGuidelines
20110127.pdf.
30
Mr. Branson has authored NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KEEPS
WOMEN OUT OF AMERICA’S BOARDROOMS (2007) and THE LAST MALE BASTION: GENDER AND THE
CEO SUITE IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC COMPANIES (2010).
31
Ms. MacLeod Heminway has authored Sex, Trust, and Corporate Boards, 18 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 173 (2007).
32
Mr. Rosenblum has authored Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 55 (2009).
24
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produced significant scholarship addressing the issue.33
C. Government Initiatives (or Lack Thereof)
In contrast to these efforts by advocacy groups, investors, and
academics, the federal government has largely failed to address the lack of
diversity on corporate boards. The SEC’s recent adoption of a disclosure
rule addressing board diversity is the only exception to this governmental
inaction.
1. Congress
Because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination only against employees,34 directors are outside its
protections.35 While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act requires the SEC to create and staff an Office of Minority
and Women Inclusion to, among other things, “assess[] the diversity policies
and practices of entities regulated by the agency[,]”36 the statute expressly
does not give the SEC authority to require diversity measures.37 In any
event, the SEC has deferred creating and staffing this office due to budget
uncertainty.38
2. Treasury
The executive branch failed to use opportunities presented by the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) to improve the diversity on
boards. As a result of the TARP bailouts of five corporations, the U.S.
Department of the Treasury became a controlling shareholder and had the
opportunity to select or significantly influence the appointment of directors
at these corporations.39 By reason of its holdings of preferred shares in a
33
See, e.g., Jennifer K. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Board Diversity and Corporate Performance, 89
N.C. L. REV. 715, 715–1082 (2011); Rhode & Packel, supra note 2, at 1; Jayne W. Barnard, More
Women on Corporate Boards? Not So Fast, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703, 703–06 (2007); Lisa
Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, People of Color, and the
Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1105–07 (2005).
34
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
35
1 ARTHUR LARSON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 4.05 (2d ed. 2008) (citing to
legislative history).
36
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
342(b)(2)(C), 124 Stat. 1376, 1541 (2010).
37
See id. § 342(b)(4) (stating that it should not be construed “to require any specific action based on
the findings of the assessment”).
38
See Memorandum from H. David Kotz, Inspector Gen., to the Honorable Barbara Lee, Subcomm.
on Fin. Servs. and Gen. Gov’t (June 15, 2011), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/
AuditsInspections/2011/Report_6_15_11.pdf.
39
See Barbara Black, The U.S. as “Reluctant Shareholder”: Government, Business and the Law, 5
ENTREPRENEUR BUS. L.J. 561, 562 (2010) (discussing the government’s actions as controlling
shareholder).
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number of other corporations, the Treasury has the power to appoint
directors under certain circumstances, as when the corporation misses at
least six consecutive dividend payments.40 The Treasury has never
discussed what attributes it deems important in filling directorships at these
failed companies, but their actions do not suggest that diversity is an
important consideration.
As a result of TARP financing, the Treasury controls American
International Group, Inc. (“AIG”), and has the power to elect all of its
directors.41 At AIG, aside from the CEO, seven directors elected by
shareholders at the 2010 shareholders meeting joined the board after
September 2008.42 Six of the seven are men; the median age is sixty-four.
Six are retired CEOs or other senior management; one is currently senior
management. The median service on other boards is two. Two additional
directors appointed directly by the Treasury because of its preferred share
holdings are both retired, male CEOs of approximately the same age.43
In July 2009, as a result of TARP financing, the Treasury owned
33.6% common-stock interest in Citigroup;44 in 2010, the Treasury began to
sell off its common-stock holdings and, as of December 31, 2010, no longer
owned common stock.45 At Citigroup, since the bailout through the 2010
annual meeting, eight new independent directors were elected to the board.
Seven of them are male and the median age is sixty-three; four are retired
CEOs, two are current CEOs or senior management, one is an academic, and
one is the former President of Mexico. The median number of other boards
they serve on is two.46
When GM and Chrysler emerged from bankruptcy in mid-2009, the
Treasury had the power, because of its investments in each company, to
designate a total of fourteen directors.47 “Eleven of the fourteen directors
40
The Treasury engaged a search firm to identify candidates and has interviewed possible directors.
Quarterly Report to Congress, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, 106 (Apr. 28, 2011), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/
2011/April2011_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf [hereinafter SIGTARP].
41
Am. Int’l Group, Inc., Proxy Statement 9–10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 4, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000093041311002523/c64660_def14a.htm#c64660_
relationships1 [hereinafter AIG Proxy Statement].
42
Black, supra note 39, at 580. At the 2011 shareholders meeting, two new directors were elected,
both of whom are men. American Int’l (AIG) Has Selected Two New Directors, STREETINSIDER (Mar.
11, 2011), http://www.streetinsider.com/Management+Changes/American+Intl+%28AIG%29+Has+
Selected+Two+New+Directors/6362219.html.
43
Black, supra note 39, at 580. In 2011, the shareholders elected these two directors because the
Treasury’s preferred shares were converted to common stock. AIG Proxy Statement, supra note 41, at
11.
44
Black, supra note 39, at 573.
45
SIGTARP, supra note 40, at 119.
46
Black, supra note 39, at 586.
47
Id. at 589. The Treasury’s equity holdings in each company have subsequently been reduced.
SIGTARP, supra note 40, at 45–46. On July 21, 2011, the Treasury withdrew its investment in Chrysler.
Press Release, Treasury Exits Investment in Chrysler Group LLC (July 21, 2011),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1253.aspx.
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[were] men; the median age [was] 60. Five [were] current CEOs or senior
management, seven [were] retired CEOs or senior management, two [were]
academics . . . . The median number of other boards [was] between one and
two.”48
At Ally, formerly known as GMAC, the government has appointed
four directors.49 Three are men and the median age is sixty-one; one is
currently a CEO, one is an investment banker, and two are executives in
private equity firms.50
In short, the directors at the corporations in which the U.S.
government was a controlling shareholder were a very homogeneous group
who fit the template of the independent director in a publicly traded
corporation: a predominately white, male cohort of retired CEOs who also
serve on several other corporate boards.
3. SEC
In December 2009, the SEC adopted a number of amendments to
the proxy disclosure rules, including amendments that require companies to
set forth information for each director and nominee about that person’s
specific qualifications for membership on the company’s board.51 In
addition, Rule 407(c)(2)(vi) requires companies to:
Describe . . . whether, and if so how, the nominating
committee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying
nominees for director. If the nominating committee (or the
board) has a policy with regard to the consideration of
diversity in identifying director nominees, describe how this
policy is implemented, as well as how the nominating
committee (or the board) assesses the effectiveness of its
policy[.] 52
The SEC had not included a required disclosure about diversity in
its initial proposal, but requested comments on whether the SEC should
amend the rules to require disclosure of additional factors that the
nominating committee should consider, such as board diversity.53 The SEC
48

Black, supra note 39, at 589.
SIGTARP, supra note 40, at 163.
50
Black, supra note 39, at 592 (reporting information as to the first three directors appointed by the
Treasury); Press Release, Treasury Names Appointee to Ally Board of Directors (Feb. 28, 2011),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1080.aspx (reporting information as to
fourth director).
51
See SEC Proxy Rule 401(e), 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(e) (2011).
52
Id. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi).
53
Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 35,076, 35,084 (July 17, 2009).
49
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stated that it was “interested in understanding whether investors and other
market participants believe that diversity in the boardroom is a significant
issue.”54 A number of commenters responded that disclosure about board
diversity was important information to investors and that it would provide
investors with information about corporate culture and governance practices
that would allow investors to make more informed voting decisions.55 In the
Final Release, the SEC “agree[d] that it is useful for investors to understand
how the board considers and addresses diversity, as well as the board’s
assessment of the implementation of its diversity policy, if any.”56
Moreover, “[a]lthough the amendments are not intended to steer behavior,
diversity policy disclosure may also induce beneficial changes in board
composition.”57 Nominating committees might, for example, conduct
broader searches that would improve director quality or result in directors
with fewer ties to the board or management and greater independence.58
The SEC, however, did not define diversity because it:
recognize[s] that companies may define diversity in various
ways, reflecting different perspectives. For instance, some
companies may conceptualize diversity expansively to
include differences of viewpoint, professional experience,
education, skill and other individual qualities and attributes
that contribute to board heterogeneity, while others may
focus on diversity concepts such as race, gender and
national origin. [The SEC] believe[s] that . . . companies
should be allowed to define diversity in ways that they
consider appropriate.59
What is the track record to date after two cycles of proxy
statements? The results to date are disappointing for anyone who expected
that boards would become more transparent in addressing their commitment
to gender diversity.60 An SEC staff review of disclosures found deficiencies
in two primary areas. Some companies took the position that the rule
required disclosure only if companies had a formal diversity policy and did
54

Id.
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 (Dec. 23, 2009).
56
Id.
57
Id. at 68,355.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 68,344.
60
See Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm’r, Keynote Speech by SEC Commissioner: Still Fighting for
Inclusion and Equal Opportunity (Apr. 21, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2011/spch042111laa.htm (stating that “many companies can do better”); Elisse B. Walter, SEC Comm’r,
Remarks at the DirectWomen Board Institute (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2011/spch021011ebw-2.htm (stating that “the corporate track record for disclosure under
this new requirement is quite spotty so far”). An EDGAR search located eighty-five staff comment
letters from the effective date of the rule through July 11, 2011, that referred to disclosure deficiencies.
The two most common were failure to include any disclosure and failure to disclose diversity
considerations.
55

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol37/iss1/2

2011]

STALLED: GENDER DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS

15

not apply if its policy was informal.61 Other companies disclosed they had a
policy; however, these companies failed to disclose how they evaluated its
effectiveness.62 These findings are consistent with my own limited review
of the proxy disclosures of a number of Fortune 500 companies, including
those of the ten companies that have both women CEOs and 25% or more
women directors,63 since these companies may be expected to exhibit best
practices. None of them stated that it had a formal policy on diversity.
Diversity was most commonly described as diversity of backgrounds, skills,
experiences, and perspectives. Furthermore, several did not explicitly
identify gender as a factor of diversity. After personal attributes (integrity,
independence, etc.), business expertise was most frequently identified as
important. The discussions about the importance of diversity are even more
abbreviated or formulaic at companies with zero women directors, the group
of companies that we might hope would recognize the need to change.
D. The Exchanges’ Corporate Governance Standards
At least since 2004, the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and
NASDAQ are the regulators principally responsible for establishing
corporate governance standards with respect to the companies listed for
trading on their exchanges.64 In 2002, the SEC’s Chairman asked them to
review their corporate governance standards in light of the Enron/Worldcom
failures. NYSE subsequently proposed, and the SEC approved, Section
303A of the NYSE Listed Company’s Manual, which requires that listed
companies have a majority of independent directors.65 Other requirements
include an independent nominating committee,66 which is responsible for
61
Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm’r, Keynote Speech at 2011 Hispanic Association of Corporate
Responsibility—Corporate Directors Summit: An Update on Diversity and Financial Literacy (Apr. 30,
2011), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch043011laa.htm.
62
Id.
63
Avon Products, Proxy Statement 8, 16 (Form DEF 14A) (March 25, 2010); Xerox, Proxy
Statement 9, 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 8, 2010); WellPoint, Inc., Proxy Statement 11, 17 (Form DEF
14A) (Apr. 2, 2010); PepsiCo, Inc., Proxy Statement 12, 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 23, 2010); ArcherDaniels-Midland Co., Proxy Statement 4, 5 (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 24, 2010); BJ’s Wholesale Club,
Proxy Statement 4, 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 16, 2010); Sunoco, Inc., Proxy Statement 3, 5 (Form DEF
14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Proxy Statement 12, 21 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar.
19, 2010); Reynolds Am., Inc., Proxy Statement 9, 22 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 22, 2010); TJX Co. Inc.,
Proxy Statement 4–6 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 28, 2010).
64
See ABA, Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57
BUS. LAW. 1487, 1553 (2002) (explaining that corporate governance listing standards fill a gap between
state corporate law and federal securities laws in matters of concern to the exchanges).
65
NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A (2009), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/
LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp%5F1%5F4%5F3%5F1&CiRestriction=
303A&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F; NYSE Listed Company Manual § 5605
(2006), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/nasdaq_ listing_req_fees.pdf.
66
NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.04. NASDAQ requires that independent directors select,
or recommend to the full board for their selection, nominees for directors, either through a nominating
committee or by executive session. NASDAQ Listing Rules § 5605(d)–(e).
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identifying qualified board candidates consistent with criteria approved by
the board,67 and an independent audit committee whose members are
financially literate and one of whom must have accounting or related
financial-management expertise.68 These provisions are, according to the
NYSE, “designed to further the ability of honest and well-intentioned
directors, officers, and employees . . . to perform their functions effectively
. . . [and to] allow shareholders to . . . monitor the performance of companies
and directors in order to reduce instances of lax and unethical behavior.”69
Although the focus of the corporate governance standards was on
fraud prevention, some held out the hope that the standards would
encourage boards to engage in a wider search for well-qualified,
independent directors that, in turn, would result in the nomination and
election of more female directors.70 To date, at least, the evidence shows
small gains.71 Neither the NYSE nor NASDAQ has any listing standards
with respect to diversity, nor does it appear that either exchange ever
seriously considered adoption of any such standards.72
E. Explanations
Why has progress toward greater female representation on boards
stalled? Professor Jayne Barnard posits a number of reasons, including “the
desire to maintain social comfort levels and board cohesion, narrow search
criteria and procedures for selecting new directors, skepticism about the socalled ‘business case’ in favor of appointing women to corporate boards,
and plain old-fashioned sex discrimination.”73
In addition, many businesses do not believe that diversity is “a
business imperative.”74 In the post-financial crisis world, where businesses
are under increasing pressure from a number of fronts to improve their
bottom line, increasing diversity may simply not be a business priority.
67
NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.04(b)(1). Apart from the requirement of a written
charter the Rule does not impose requirements on the process used by the committee in identifying
candidates. See id.
68
NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.07. NASDAQ’s comparable standard is NASDAQ
Listing Rules § 5605(c).
69
NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance, SEC Rel. No. 34-48745, 81
SEC Docket 1586 (Nov. 4, 2003).
70
See Cynthia A. Glassman, SEC Comm’r, Remarks Before the 2005 Colloquium for Women
Directors: Board Diversity: The 21st Century Challenge “The New Regulatory Climate and Impact on
Board Composition” (Nov. 11, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch111105cag.htm.
71
Between 2004 and 2010, women gained a total increase of 1.1 percentage points on Fortune 100
boards. Alliance for Board Diversity, Missing Pieces: Women and Minorities on Fortune 500 Boards,
CATALYST, 4 (July 21, 2011), http://www.catalyst.org/file/469/abd_2010_census.pdf.
72
Although three commenters to the NYSE 2002 proposal recommended adding considerations
such as ethnic and gender diversity to the discussion of independence, it is not discussed in the Final
Release. NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance, SEC Rel. No. 34-48745, 81
SEC Docket 1586 (Nov. 4, 2003).
73
Barnard, supra note 33, at 704.
74
Rhode & Packel, supra note 2, at 15 (quoting Kodak CEO).
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Finally, corporate America may have embraced the trend toward facially
neutral policies as the fair approach to find the best candidates.75
II.

WHAT NEXT?

SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar, who has been in the forefront of
advocating for increased board diversity, posits that what is missing is “the
will to act.”76 What additional initiatives could be pursued to motivate
issuers? This section considers three approaches, ranging from mild to
aggressive.
First, the SEC staff can rigorously review the required diversity
disclosures and provide comments to issuers on their deficiencies, in order
to ensure that investors receive more meaningful information about
companies’ diversity practices. This jaw-boning by the SEC staff may not
only improve disclosure of diversity practices, but also facilitate campaigns
by institutional investors to improve board diversity.77 In fact, SEC
Commissioner Aguilar has asked the SEC staff to monitor the situation.78
This mild approach has the advantage of giving the SEC disclosure rules an
opportunity to work. Nevertheless, even if the disclosures become less
formulaic, this does not necessarily result in issuers improving the diversity
of their boards.
Two other approaches would require action on the part of the NYSE
and NASDAQ, consistent with their role as principal regulators of the
corporate governance standards of their listed companies.79 The first is the
customary approach of the exchanges’ convening a blue-ribbon panel of
industry leaders to develop best practices for improving board diversity.80
Although adoption of the standards would not be mandatory, issuers would
have to implement these best practices or explain why they have elected not
to do so (“comply-or-explain”).81 Adoption of diversity best practices
75

Cf. James Fanto et al., Justifying Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 901, 927 (2011).
Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm’r, Board Diversity: Why It Matters and How to Improve It (Nov. 4,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch110410laa.htm.
77
Institutional investors, however, have lost a potentially valuable look with the D.C. Circuit’s
vacating the SEC rule affording shareholders proxy access in certain limited circumstances. See Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, No. 10-1305, 2011 WL 2936808 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2011).
78
Aguilar, supra note 61.
79
Absent Congressional authorization, the SEC’s power to impose corporate governance standards
is limited. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 407, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding the Exchange Act §
19(c) did not confer authority on SEC to impose corporate governance listing standards on exchanges).
80
See, e.g., NYSE & NASD, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
ON IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE AUDIT COMMITTEES (1999), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/Blue_Ribbon_Panel.pdf (identifying experts in the field of corporate audit
committees).
81
See ABA, supra note 64, at 1490 (proposing a similar approach with respect to certain corporate
governance standards).
76
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would work in tandem with the SEC rule and should improve the quality of
disclosure because those best practices would be the benchmark for
assessing issuers’ commitment to diversity. Issuers could no longer refer
vaguely to informal policies that take into account diversity of backgrounds,
skills, experiences, and perspectives, or otherwise resort to vague or
boilerplate language. As a result, investors should have better information
to assess the adequacy of the issuers’ efforts. The expectations are that
adoption of best practices will cause boards to examine critically their
current practices and that issuers would be reluctant to deviate from best
practices unless they had good reason to believe their practices were better
fashioned to find the best nominees for their board. Unfortunately,
however, these expectations may not be met, especially if issuers do not
recognize the value of the best practices or a diversified board.
A final approach is suggested by recent speeches of SEC
Commissioner Luis Aguilar, in which he frequently cites as a laudable
example the adoption by the National Football League (“NFL”) of the
Rooney Rule, which requires all NFL teams to interview at least one
minority candidate when filling a head coaching position.82 Since the
Rooney Rule was adopted in 2003, 22% of head coaching positions have
been filled with minorities.83 An important, if not the key, factor to the
success of the Rooney Rule is that it is more than an aspirational statement
of best practices. An affinity group consisting of African-American
coaches, scouts, and front-office officials monitors the efforts and notifies
the NFL if it suspects violations.84 Failure to comply can result in hefty
fines.85
Similarly, if a Rooney Rule for corporate boards is to have real
force, it must be a corporate governance rule with real consequences for
failure to comply. It is time for the NYSE and NASDAQ, as the institutions
principally responsible for the corporate governance standards of the largest
publicly traded domestic issuers, seriously to consider adopting and
enforcing a rule that would require nominating committees to interview at
least one woman for each vacancy among the independent directors. The
previously identified leadership organizations and institutional investors
would continue their efforts to assist corporate boards in achieving more
diverse boards, as by identifying qualified candidates, but the exchanges
would provide the will to act in the form of an enforcement stick.86
82

See Aguilar, supra note 76. See N. JEREMI DURU, ADVANCING THE BALL: RACE, REFORMATION,
QUEST FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE NFL (2011), for background information and the
implementation of the Rooney Rule.
83
Aguilar, supra note 76.
84
DURU, supra note 82, at 143.
85
Id. at 129.
86
Aguilar, supra note 76. The ultimate sanction for non-compliance with the listing standards is
trading suspension and delisting. Since these are harmful to investors, Rule 303A.13 of the NYSE Listed
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Do the exchanges currently have the statutory authority to require
adoption of a Rooney Rule? The legal limit of the exchanges’ authority to
adopt rules on corporate governance matters is unclear.87 The Exchange Act
gives the exchanges broad authority to adopt rules, among other purposes,
“to promote just and equitable principles of trade . . . and, in general, to
protect investors and the public interest,”88 but those phrases are so vague
that they do not provide much guidance. Conversely, the rules cannot be
designed to regulate “matters not related to the purposes of this chapter” and
cannot be designed to permit “unfair discrimination” between issuers.89
Finally, the SEC shall approve an exchange’s proposed rule if the agency
finds it “consistent with the requirements of this chapter and the rules and
regulations thereunder applicable to such organizations.”90 Conversely, it
shall disapprove the proposed rule if it does not make such a finding.91 In its
2003 approval of the NYSE/NASDAQ corporate governance listing
standards, the SEC emphasized the role of good governance practices in
“maintain[ing] effective oversight of the reliability of corporate financial
information[,]” consequently “enhanc[ing] investor confidence in the
securities markets.”92 Some may argue that there is no statutory authority
for a mandatory exchange rule on diversity without a stronger showing of a
connection between diversity and good corporate governance. Yet, the SEC
recognized in its adoption of a disclosure rule on diversity that many
investors care about diversity, and that efforts to increase diversity could
promote better board performance by improving both the qualifications and
the independence of directors.93
III.

REASONS FOR CARING

Finally, why should we care about the abysmal lack of diversity in
corporate boardrooms?94 Some advocates think it is necessary to advance
the business case that increased board diversity improves the corporate

Company Manual provides for a public reprimand letter as a lesser sanction to deter violations. NYSE
Listed Company Manual § 303A.13.
87
ABA, supra note 64, at 1516.
88
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2006).
89
Id.
90
Id. § 78s.
91
Id.
92
Order Approving NYSE and NASDAQ Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate
Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64, 175–76 (Nov. 12, 2003).
93
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 (Dec. 23, 2009).
94
Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm’r, Statement by SEC Commissioner: The Abysmal Lack of
Diversity in Corporate Boardrooms is Growing Worse (May 2, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2011/spch050211laa.htm.
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bottom line.95 These assertions may be overstated, because, to date, the
empirical support for the proposition that increased board diversity improves
corporate performance is mixed. While there are studies that find that
diversity improves board oversight,96 Professor Rhode and Ms. Packel
recently reviewed empirical studies on the impact of diversity on corporate
financial performance, and concluded that the relationship between diversity
and financial performance has not been convincingly established.97
However, the studies do provide some support for the assertion that
diversity can improve decision-making and enhance the corporate image.98
Is it really necessary to make a business case to justify increased
efforts toward board diversity?99 The number of women, including
professional women, in corporate America, should put the onus on the
business community to explain their failures to nominate more female
candidates for board positions. It cannot be for lack of qualified women;
advocacy groups and institutional investors have redoubled their efforts to
develop talent banks for corporate America.100 Perhaps the need for a
business justification would be more persuasive if we had greater
confidence that current nomination practices achieved the objective of a
well-functioning board of directors. Given the poor performance of the
boards of many leading financial institutions during the recent financial
crisis, it is hard to believe that the presence of more women in the
boardroom would have a deleterious effect on risk-management oversight,
to cite one egregious failing. In short, a business justification for increased
female representation on corporate boards hardly seems necessary.
To date, it is clear that relying on corporations, on their own, to
improve their track record on diversity has not significantly improved board
diversity. Without more aggressive intervention, this will continue to be a
slog to equality. The lack of progress is profoundly discouraging for those
who believe in meritocracy. This is an issue of equal opportunity.

95
See, e.g., Virtcom Consulting, supra note 5, at 14 (“Core business concepts such as competitive
advantage, organizational performance, creativity, innovation and shareowner value are the new talking
points linked to a diverse slate of board directors.”).
96
See, e.g., Press Release, Cal. State Public Employees Retirement System, Diverse Corporate
Boards Achieve Higher Performance, CalPERS Report Says (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/
index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-archive/pr-2009/feb/diverse-boards-higher-performance.xml (discussing a
study that found that “[c]ompanies that have diverse boards perform better than those with similar
director profiles in terms of ethnicity, gender and skill sets”).
97
Rhode & Packel, supra note 2; see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New
Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 856, 861–62 (2011) (reviewing the empirical evidence);
Fanto, supra note 75, at 918 (reviewing existing studies).
98
Rhode & Packel, supra note 2.
99
See Fanto, supra note 75, at 906 (arguing that diversity advocates should offer normative
frameworks other than finance-based shareholder value to justify board diversity).
100
See, e.g., Cal. State Teachers’ Retirement Sys., supra note 27 (working to develop digital
resources aimed at increasing board diversity).
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